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In 2013 the direction of future Chinese international leadership was set out with Chinese 
president Xi Jinping’s launch of what is now known as the ‘belt and road initiative’ (BRI), 
formerly ‘one belt, one road’ (OBOR). The ‘belt’ refers to the Silk Road Economic Belt, which 
focuses on bringing together China, Central Asia, Russia and Europe, linking China and the 
Indian Ocean with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea through Central Asia. It consists 
of a network of overland routes and railroads, oil and natural gas pipelines, and power grids. 
The ‘road’ refers to the 21st Century Maritime Silk Road, which is designed to go from China’s 
coast to Europe through the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from 
China’s coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in the other. It consists of a 
network of ports and other coastal infrastructure projects. In the four years since its official 
launch, some 60 countries across its Eurasian area have expressed their interest in partnering 
with this BRI program. To date, it is unclear what exactly such ‘partnering’ involves, but it is 
clear that expressions of interest in projects are welcomed and that Chinese investments are 
expected.1 A strategic initiative launched from the highest level of government, the BRI is 
backed by substantial financial as well as political firepower. The initiative is understood as 
the concrete manifestation of previous visions such as ‘harmonious world’ and ‘peaceful 
development’, as well as of Xi’s ‘Chinese dream’ of national rejuvenation from national 
humiliation.2 As such, many expect that it will be a key determinant of the direction not only 
of China’s future, but of the world’s future as it negotiates the anticipated rise of China to 
growing levels of wealth and power. 
This article focuses on what may appear to be contradictory directions of development 
expressed through the BRI, namely the push towards networked capitalism on the one hand, 
and the focus on the Chinese national unit on the other. It argues that the networked capitalism 
and the national unit are both imagined, and by extension potentially exercised, through the 
BRI in mutually supporting ways. Networked capitalism is not challenging the national spatial 
unit, or vice versa. Rather, they fuse in ways that reinforce Chinese government narratives that 
portray China as the new trailblazer of global capitalism, which it will lead better than the 
United States, specifically illustrating and justifying a new Sinocentric order in and beyond 
East Asia. Likely winners of this constellation, if successful, are megalopolises in Eurasia, and 
most of all the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Likely losers are countries who are not 
included in the BRI, most notably the United States. 
In making this argument, this article draws on a range of official and unofficial sources to 
understand how the BRI is expressed, and not, in contemporary Chinese elite discourse. 
Official documents and elite interviews enable us to examine how Chinese elites are 
interpreting and elaborating on official Chinese government narratives, and how they seek to 
portray such narratives to foreign audiences in particular. This article therefore provides an 
account of how Chinese elites are imagining and communicating the BRI, how this portrayal 
chimes with academic analyses of the BRI inside and outside of China, and what the effects of 
such imaginaries may be, if successful. Of course, these imaginaries are not representative of 
what all Chinese people think about the BRI – the ‘silk road’ imaginary has long historical 
roots and expressions in popular culture, art and various social strata, some of which align well 
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with government and elite narratives, and some which challenge these more or less directly. 
They should also not be understood to necessarily correspond entirely with empirical realities 
and activities that have taken place under the BRI heading to date – though these imaginaries 
are important in shaping what happens ‘on the ground’, and are in turn shaped by the success 
or otherwise of concrete activities. Finally, this article discusses two dominant imaginaries of 
the BRI, as defined by networked capitalism or by the national unit, but does not suggest that 
these two imaginaries cover all elite discourse, or all academic debate. The BRI is attracting a 
lot of commentary from both academics and pundits and will continue to do so for the 
foreseeable future – this article represents a part of a larger analytical jigsaw puzzle that will 
continue to be built for some time. 
Following Norman Fairclough’s critical discourse analysis, we use the term ‘imaginaries’ here 
to denote the element of discourses or narratives that ‘not only represent the world as it is (or 
rather is seen to be)’, but that are also projective, ‘representing possible worlds which are 
different from the actual world, and tied in to projects to change the world in particular 
directions’. 3  These imaginaries are thus elements of wider discourses, which we in turn 
understand as ‘ways of representing aspects of the world – the processes, relations and 
structures of the material world, the ‘mental world’ of thoughts, feelings, beliefs and so forth, 
and the social world’.4 These imaginaries, and the broader discourses of which they are part, 
constitute part of the resources that people deploy in relating to one another and in seeking to 
change the ways in which they relate to one another. 
The richness of competing discourses amongst and beyond Chinese elites cannot be fully 
covered in our discussion here, but the dominant discourses we do discuss are important 
because of their predominance both in academic and in Chinese elite discourses. They are key 
determinants of how Chinese elites are imagining China’s present and future relations with the 
world, and of the way academics are interpreting those relations. Our argument is therefore 
relevant to scholars interested in China’s relations with the world, in world order, or in the geo-
political imagination of global networks and national units. Such networks and national units 
have been commonly understood to contradict one another, especially in debates on China.5 
This article provides a concrete example of where Chinese elite imaginaries (and potentially 
associated practices) do not conform to the idea of such contradiction. Our argument should 
also be of interest to policy makers and others who want to make sense of Chinese elite 
imaginaries of the BRI, in order to adjust their own activities to their likely or possible 
ramifications.       
One important source for understanding this elite discourse are the official speeches and 
documents where the government has outlined its policy. A full chronology of what the party-
state considers to be key events in the development of the BRI is provided through the website 
of the State Council, from which we have chosen to focus here on the more well-developed 
documents. 6  Most presentations of this framework, including in Chinese government 
documents, begin with reference to a speech by Xi in Kazakhstan in September 2013, which 
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proposed the creation of an overland ‘Silk Road economic belt’ from China to Europe, during 
a visit to Central Asia that included the summit of the Shanghai Co-operation Organisation 
(SCO). At the summit for Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in Indonesia the 
following month, Xi followed on this launch to promote also a ‘twenty-first century maritime 
Silk Road’ from China to Africa and Europe, reiterated at the subsequent East Asia Summit. 
Both ideas were prominent at the high-level party-state work forum on ‘neighbourhood’ or 
‘periphery’ diplomacy (zhoubian waijiao gongzuo zuotanhui) later that month. These initially 
vague statements were more systematically laid out in the Vision and Actions on Jointly 
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st Century Maritime Silk Road (hereafter the vision 
document) issued by the National development and Reform Commission, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the Ministry of Commerce, with State Council authorization.7 Chinese government 
representatives continue to make regular speeches and publish official documents about the 
development of BRI, further communicated through the dedicated BRI section of the website 
of the State Council.8 The BRI also features in China’s 13th five year plan, which outlines the 
country’s key priorities for 2016-2020 and dedicates a chapter to the aim to ‘Move Forward 
with the Belt and Road Initiative.’9 Finally, more recent articulations of the BRI can be seen in 
official speeches at high-level fora, including the World Economic Forum in Davos where Xi 
gave the keynote in January 2017, and the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing that he inaugurated 
in May 2017. These official articulations of the BRI are all important, because they show us 
how the party-state would like us to perceive this initiative.  
We complement our reading of these key official documents by also considering Chinese 
academic and wider elite discourse on the matter, accessed through journal articles, books, 
blogs, news articles, and ethnographic fieldwork and interviews with scholars in China. Much 
of our analysis draws on elite interviews conducted in China in 2014-17. Interviewees were 
selected through a strategic sampling method. All interviewees are individuals with personal 
insight from Chinese foreign policy development after the BRI’s announcement in 2013. They 
were chosen based on likely level of intimate knowledge of BRI proceedings, willingness to 
speak openly on the topic, and access.10 Interviews were semi-structured, and conducted face-
to-face, via video link, and by email correspondence.  
The article is divided into four sections. The first section shows how existing literatures have 
understood the BRI as primarily an expression of capitalist drives for economic gain, or the 
attempted discursive construction of a Sino-centric order. The second section argues instead 
that the two are mutually reinforcing, and productive of a narrative that portrays China as the 
new leader of global capitalism. The third section argues that such leadership implies a 
displacement of American leadership, illustrating and justifying a new Sinocentric order in and 
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beyond East Asia. The final section concludes with comments on who is likely to benefit and 
not if the BRI as currently envisaged is successful.  
Capitalist network or national unit? 
A majority of existing literature on the BRI falls into two broad categories. The first strand of 
literature understands it as primarily or exclusively a capitalist undertaking, pursued in order 
to enrich Chinese stakeholders and contribute to continued GDP growth for China. This 
primarily economic logic is unsurprisingly emphasized by many scholars who draw on Marxist 
theory or on liberal arguments about economic interdependence. The second strand of literature 
understands it instead as primarily a discursive strategy that seeks to rhetorically position China 
as the leader of a Sino-centric Asian order, and ultimately a new and better world order led by 
China. As one may expect, this primarily geostrategic logic is emphasized by many scholars 
who draw on constructivist notions of national identity as well as by realists who think about 
a balance of power in national zero-sum terms. Both strands of literature have significant bases 
in official Chinese documents, and both echo previous academic debates on China’s role in the 
world. 
The strand that sees BRI as primarily a capitalist endeavour includes a range of literatures that 
focus on material gains, the export of Chinese over capacity, and the need for economic 
development of China’s western regions.11 This strand of thinking has been particularly well 
developed by Tim Summers, who draws on Manuel Castells’ understanding of the global 
political economy through the metaphor of a ‘network society’.12 In this conceptualisation, the 
global political economy is increasingly dominated by global networks between metropolitan 
regions. Capital, information, technology and elites easily flow through the nodes of these 
networks, but labour does not. This spatial configuration of nodes in global networks is 
understood in terms of a shift away from a previously dominant allocation of resources based 
on national spaces or ‘surfaces’. 13  A key reason for this understanding is that the five 
‘connections’ or ‘connectivities’ that are to be prioritised according to the 2015 BRI vision 
document amount to a platform for enhancing the flows of capital, goods and consumers (as 
tourists or students) across Eurasia. These five cooperation priorities are policy coordination, 
facilities connectivity (infrastructure, logistics, communications, and energy infrastructure), 
unimpeded trade (free trade areas, customs cooperation, balancing trade flows, and protecting 
the rights of investors), financial integration (linking internationalisation of the renminbi and 
the establishment of new development banks), and finally ‘people-to-people bond’ (such as 
tourism and student exchanges).14 The understanding of these flows in terms of a network of 
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metropolitan nodes is regularly made visible in reports on the investments that feature stylised 
maps, including those published by official news agency Xinhua, that proliferate in other news 
and social media, as well as in academic texts. Such maps typically depict the BRI by 
illustrating dotted lines that connect dots that represent major cities like Guangzhou, Kuala 
Lumpur, Nairobi, Moscow, Tehran, Istanbul, and Rotterdam.15 
The strand that sees BRI primarily in terms of the discursive construction of a Sino-centric 
order tends to deploy geostrategic language, 16  focus on the ‘China Dream’ and Chinese 
government calls to develop a ‘Silk Road spirit’ (silu jingshen),17 or draw comparisons with 
the United States’ Marshall Plan for Europe after the second world war 18 . William A. 
Callahan’s contribution to this strand of literature has been particularly strong in articulating 
how the BRI contributes to reconstituting regional, and eventually global, order with new 
governance ideas, norms, and rules.19 He understands the BRI as contributing to a redirection 
of Chinese foreign policy since Xi became leader of the Chinese party-state in 2012, where it 
combines with new ideas (like the ‘Chinese Dream’ and the ‘Asia Dream’), new policies (like 
‘comprehensive diplomacy and security’), and new institutions (like the Asia Infrastructure 
Investment Bank, AIIB) to build what Xi calls a ‘community of shared destiny’ (gongtong 
mingyunti), and which Callahan shows to be Sinocentric.20 Xi is explicit that Asian cooperation 
must expand from the mutual benefit that has long been touted by Beijing, to also promote 
‘shared beliefs and norms of conduct for the whole region’.21 Such shared beliefs include 
commonly repeated ideas like mutual respect, mutual trust, reciprocity, equality, and win-win, 
but also traditional Chinese ideas of a hierarchical regional system with parallels in the 
historical ‘tributary system’. Notably, the very term ‘peripheral diplomacy’ (zhoubian waijiao) 
assumes that China is at the centre and other countries are at the margins. Such a view has also 
been underlined by official comments, such as when Foreign Minister Yang Jiechi told south-
east Asian leaders in 2010 that ‘China is a big country and other countries are small countries, 
and that’s just a fact’.22 Callahan moreover points out that economic activities like those 
discussed above are leveraged to build a ‘community of shared destiny’ in Asia, which in turn 
will enable China to set normative agendas and rules of the game for global governance.23 
                                                          
15  For example Xinhua, ‘Belt and Road Initiative’, 24 June 2016, http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-
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16 Theresa Fallon, ‘The New Silk Road. Xi Jinping's Grand Strategy for Eurasia’, American Foreign Policy 
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21 Xi Jinping, The governance of China, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 2014), p. 327, see Callahan, ‘China's 
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Narratives of capitalist networks and a nationalist Chinese unit converge to portray 
China as the leader and protector of capitalism. 
Both the literatures above make valid and important points about China’s changing role in the 
current world order. It is typical for literatures that fall into one of the strands to also 
acknowledge the relevance of the other. Here, we build on both strands together, to emphasise 
and further reflect on the mutual entwinement of the two logics they put forward. 
In the broader literatures on geography and space, the two types of logic described above are 
sometimes seen as contradictory, where the spatialisation of networked nodes is understood to 
conflict with or supersede the nationalist imaginary of the modern state system as consisting 
of integral and mutually exclusive units or surfaces. This used to be a commonly held view in 
early commentary on globalisation, for example, and still underpins many popular and media 
narratives today. Such a tendency can also be seen in literatures on the BRI, many of which 
understand it as either an economic or a geopolitical project. Along similar lines, Summers 
recognises that the need to maintain autonomy is an essential underpinning of China’s joining 
global capitalism, but nonetheless insists that ‘it is primarily the economic and commercial 
drivers – the logic of China’s role in reproducing a global capitalist economy – which lie behind 
the elevation of building infrastructure across the Eurasian continent into a strategic belt and 
road initiative’. 24  Recent literatures on spatial imaginaries in China have provided an 
alternative or corrective to analyses that see the two imaginaries as opposed, and show instead 
how spatial ideas of bounded units and unbounded networks are deployed in mutually 
supportive ways in Chinese official and academic discourse.25 Here, we argue that the BRI 
perpetuates such mutual reinforcement of unitary nationalist and networked capitalist logics. 
The collocation of the networked and unit-based imaginaries of space is immediately visible 
from the kinds of maps discussed above. Notably, the maps that depict the BRI by illustrating 
metropolitan dots connected by lines do not do so against a plain white background, but 
typically superimpose that illustration of networks on a standard Mercator map of national 
territories. Visually, the two imaginaries clearly co-exist. 
In rhetorical and practical terms, Xi’s policy as well as much of the academic commentary on 
the BRI, are highly nationalistic and take ‘China’ as their main point of reference. In such 
commentary, China will be able to maintain its territorial integrity if it can be powerful enough 
to deter others from ‘interfering’ in its ‘internal affairs’, which includes the management of 
what Beijing terms ‘splittist’ movements in regions such as Tibet, Xinjiang, and Taiwan. A 
central way of building such imagined power, and maintaining territorial integrity, is to 
continue the remarkable (but slowing) economic growth that China has enjoyed since the 
beginning of reform and opening up in the early 1980s. It is precisely the expectation of China’s 
continued economic growth that attracts others to its world view and development model. At 
the same time, the Chinese state and its discourse of greatness is also a key driver of the capital 
investment that enables the BRI infrastructure and other forms of ‘connectivity’ to be built. As 
Summers also underlines, the BRI has been accompanied by institutional innovations that will 
make possible the investment to implement the infrastructure connectivity outlined in the 
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vision document, particularly in the form of a Silk Road Fund to be capitalised to $40 billion 
and the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) for which $100 billion will be raised.26 
The Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in May 2017 was Xi’s flagship event to bring the BRI 
forward, and involved the announcement of further Chinese funding for the project: an 
additional RMB 100 billion ($14.5 billion) into the Silk Road Fund; new lending schemes of 
250 billion ($36.2 billion) and RMB 130 billion ($18.8 billion) set up by the China 
Development Bank and Export-Import Bank respectively, for BRI projects; and RMB 60 
billion ($8.7 billion) provided by China for humanitarian efforts focused on food, housing, 
health care, and poverty alleviation.27 These are state-led initiatives that are motivated by Xi’s 
Chinese dream of ‘national rejuvenation,’ which, as Callahan shows, involves the BRI in 
visions of Chinese rise to leadership of a Sinocentric world order. Simply put, the discourse of 
China’s national power and territorial integrity rely on simultaneous discourses about its role 
as the key driver of capitalism, and vice versa. Others go along with that narrative because Xi 
invites them to board ‘the express train of China’s development’.28 
There are of course questions to be asked about the express train narrative, as the successful 
implementation of BRI is in no way a done deal. One major issue is whether there are enough 
profitable projects to go around to make BRI a long-term success, as it is clear from the outset 
that political demands conflict with profitability. A good example here is the BRI railway 
routes, most of which need government subsidies (an average of USD 3500-4000 per trip for a 
20-foot container).29 Chinese state and state-backed funding is extensive, but not unlimited.30 
This problem is further exacerbated by the fact that many countries along the BRI are unstable 
with poor sovereign credit rating, almost by default getting China involved in complex 
geopolitics. Two good examples here are problems related to Ukraine and Central Asia, both 
of which are important areas in the building of the Silk Road Economic Belt outside Russian 
control. China had put great effort into developing good relations with the Ukraine at the time 
of Russian annexation of Crimea in 2011, and now finds itself at the epicentre of geopolitical 
struggle.31 Central Asia is in turn an unstable region with complex geopolitics involving a large 
number of external actors, which makes it an area of high risk investment. Our interviews 
indicated a sense amongst Chinese elites that while Chinese leaders are aware of risks related 
to the BRI, in particular in the security area, its preparedness for bad loans may be less good.32 
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Xi made the ‘express train’ comment as part of a speech to the World Economic Forum in 
Davos, which he was the first Chinese president to ever attend in January 2017. In his speech, 
Xi called for world leaders to ‘keep to the goal of building a community of shared future for 
mankind’ and argued that ‘while developing itself, China also shares more of its development 
outcomes with other countries and peoples.’ He argued that ‘[r]apid growth in China has been 
a sustained, powerful engine for global economic stability and expansion…. And China’s 
continuous progress in reform and opening-up has lent much momentum to an open world 
economy.’ Xi promised that China will:  
strive to enhance the performance of economic growth … boost market vitality to add 
new impetus to growth … and enable the market to play a decisive role in resources 
allocation … foster an enabling and orderly environment for investment … expand 
market access for foreign investors, build high-standard pilot free trade zones, 
strengthen protection of property rights, and level the playing field to make China’s 
market more transparent and better regulated … foster an external environment of 
opening-up for common development …. advance the building of the Free Trade Area 
of the Asia Pacific and negotiations of the Regional Comprehensive Economic 
Partnership to form a global network of free trade arrangements.  
In other words, the president of China stood amongst world leaders and promised that China 
would be a defender, promoter and leader of global capitalism and free trade. He concluded his 
list of promises with a discussion of the BRI as an example and promise of such leadership: 
‘The “Belt and Road” initiative originated in China, but it has delivered benefits well beyond 
its borders’.33 This speech thereby repeated the language of capitalism and economic growth 
rolled out in the vision document, which states that the BRI is ‘designed to uphold the global 
free trade regime and the open world economy … [i]t is aimed at promoting orderly and free 
flow of economic factors, highly efficient allocation of resources and deep integration of 
markets’.34 This narrative is also repeated in the 13th five-year plan, according to which BRI 
‘will actively engage in negotiations with countries and regions along the routes of the Belt 
and Road Initiative on the building of free trade areas’ as part of speeding up its free trade area 
strategy.35 In both the vision document and the five-year plan, the emphasis is on regional 
‘hubs’ as the focus for the envisaged connecting pipelines and corridors.36 The same rhetoric 
was again key to Xi’s narrative at the May 2017 Belt and Road Forum, where he pledged that 
the initiative would ‘uphold the multilateral trading regime, advance the building of free trade 
areas and promote liberalization and facilitation of trade and investment’.37 It is not yet entirely 
clear to what extent the BRI offers a different version of capitalism. Xi’s Davos speech, the 
vision document and the five-year plan jointly indicate that on a rhetorical level at least, Xi is 
trying to reassure world leaders that he wants to maintain the existing free trade system, by 
ironing out some of its problems and continuing to open up markets. One of our interviewees 
accordingly summed up the BRI as an economic cooperation model that is government led and 
market driven.38 Others, however, see it as a new economic model after the global economic 
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system has moved beyond both mercantilism and the free market.39 BRI, on such a view, is 
part of a third model, which moves beyond the US-led free market model, but which remains 
capitalist. While there was no consensus among our interviewees on whether or not the BRI 
represents a new model, a number of features were emphasized throughout, with all describing 
the BRI as market driven, government led, non-legalistic and investment focused.40 To cite one 
interviewee, ‘China gives a choice between rules-first projects and an investment-first 
approach. … It is an offer of engagement, without [the same] rules [as is often preferred in the 
West].41 And of course, the BRI is not detached from domestic politics. BRI is a geo-economic 
plan, a continuation of the national development plan, and a new version of ‘opening up’ for 
which reform of the Chinese economic structure is needed, moving away from the need to 
attract FDI.42 
This Chinese economic leadership of the capitalist order will furthermore be supported by 
others adopting a set of values that the BRI narratives and the vision document refer to as the 
‘Silk Road spirit’ of ‘peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, mutual learning and 
mutual benefit’. Though defined by the Chinese party-state, it is said to be ‘shared by all 
countries around the world’.43 These comments may appear innocuous enough – indeed who 
could disagree with peace and mutual benefit? Yet, such rhetoric very much follows the 
underpinning narrative of ‘harmony’, which has been part and parcel of Chinese foreign 
relations since Hu Jintao’s leadership, and which has been shown to imagine harmony as an 
ideal to which Chinese elites have privileged access, but which is simultaneously said to be 
shared by everybody in the world.44 As our interviews for this article have made clear, Chinese 
elites also understand the BRI to provide a clear direction beyond economic interests. 45 
Through such narratives, a ‘rhetorical trap’ is arguably set up, where the ‘representational 
force’ of Chinese party-state rhetoric pushes the audience to either agree with the stipulated 
understanding of China and of capitalism, or declare itself as belonging on the ‘wrong’ side of 
the divide between peaceful and unpeaceful, harmonious and disharmonious, joiners and 
outsiders.46 The audience that may be caught in such a ‘rhetorical trap’ are in this instance 
primarily foreign government and business representatives who cannot accept to see 
themselves as unpeaceful, disharmonious, or outsiders to this imagined insider community. 
However, as a similar rhetoric is aimed at wider populations as well as elites within China and 
in Chinese language, this ‘trap’ has a direct domestic parallel.  
Unsurprisingly, a certain scepticism of the BRI has emerged among a number of other regional 
powers. Not least, India has been a vocal opponent of BRI as it includes close cooperation with 
its arch-rival Pakistan, in particular in the form of the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor 
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(CPEC), that passes through Kashmir that the Indian government understands as occupied by 
Pakistan. It also undermines the Indian vision of itself as the big man in South Asia. Needless 
to say, Chinese commentators argue that Indians over-react.47 Japan has similarly shown some 
concerns. The initiative may imply a new and potentially expansionist vision for its historical 
opponent China, which if successful is likely to contribute to a power shift from Japan and the 
US to China. The BRI also intrudes into markets where Japan has an interest and presence, 
thereby creating competition.48 In Australia, defence hawks argue that liberal commentators 
who embrace the networking logic of economic interdependence are naive about Beijing’s 
geopolitical intentions.49 These concerns have at least some validity, as Chinese foreign policy, 
including the BRI, is embedded in domestic concerns for regime survival and political stability. 
The BRI here facilitates two key factors of regime-legitimisation: continuing economic growth 
and nationalism.50 When it comes to the survival of the one-Party state, there is no value in the 
BRI unless it contributes to at least one of these. 
It is important to emphasize that the BRI is neither simply a government project, nor only a 
business endeavor, but an initiative where both sides are needed to push the scheme forward. 
As one of our interviewees described it, the ‘[g]overnment builds platforms for the companies 
to perform what they would like to’, and what businesses want to do is make a profit.51 
Although a joint endeavor, the Chinese government plays a crucial role, both because BRI 
projects are heavily dependent on government-to-government cooperation and because Beijing 
is a direct or indirect source of finance. This said, what counts as a BRI project is not set in 
stone, and what is in the end labelled ‘BRI’ in official statistics is a subjective and ultimately 
political question. For example, several Chinese real estate companies call anything they build 
BRI.52 The same pattern occurs outside of China, for example in Sweden where anything that 
can be linked to infrastructure is now routinely labelled a BRI project.53 There is also an 
emerging practice among private investors to work with the Chinese government bid for 
projects, in particular in Africa and in developing countries with less-than rigorous relevant 
rules and regulations.54 When it comes to financing, the Chinese government has expressed a 
clear hope for risk-sharing with international financial markets, but to date the BRI remains 
heavily dependent on loans from state-owned banks and other forms of Chinese seed money.55 
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Narratives of capitalist networks and a nationalist Chinese unit converge to portray 
China as the better alternative to American leadership. 
The vision document is articulated in terms of the repeated imperative ‘we should,’ and though 
China is clearly behind the ‘vision’ and the subsequent ‘plan,’ the ‘we’ to which such calls 
refer is somewhat ambiguous. In comparison to previous generations of leadership, and the 
recommendations of some Chinese academics, Xi’s administration is uncharacteristically open 
about China’s and Xi’s own bid for leadership. The vision document makes clear that ‘[i]n 
advancing the Belt and Road Initiative, China will fully leverage the comparative advantages 
of its various regions,’ and president Xi and premier Li Keqiang are providing ‘[h]igh-level 
guidance and facilitation’ for the initiative.56 In his 2017 speeches to the World Economic 
Forum and the Belt and Road Forum, Xi was clear that it was he who had launched the BRI.57 
As such, the BRI is a step up from previous leadership slogans, such as Hu’s ‘harmonious 
world,’ that remained very much rhetorical outside China’s own borders. Where previous 
slogans were more ambivalent about Chinese leadership, and regularly looked back to Deng 
Xiaoping’s suggestion that China should hide its strength and bide its time, the BRI shows Xi’s 
readiness to take on new levels of leadership, in both word and deed. As one of our academic 
interviewees put it, the BRI is best understood as ‘the essence of the realisation of the Chinese 
dream and the rejuvenation of our nation … It is the framework for foreign policy in the coming 
decades to come’.58 
Under such Chinese leadership, BRI narratives claim to be open to all countries, but the vision 
document specifically refers to the connectivity of ‘Asian, European and African continents’ 
and simply tacks on a reference to ‘the rest of the world’ in one instance.59 At the Belt and 
Road Forum, these were said to be the focus of the BRI, but that the initiative was also open to 
cooperation partners from the Americas.60 Nonetheless, the most notable absence from such 
official BRI narratives remains the United States. The official plans for the BRI rarely mention 
the United States, but as Callahan notes it ‘haunts China’s aspirations as a ghost that is both 
attractive (China likewise wants to be the global hegemonic power) and repellent (China insists 
that it will be a benevolently superior global power)’.61 Notably, Xi’s Davos speech came not 
long after Donald Trump’s inauguration as president of the United States, and Trump himself 
was not present for either the World Economic Forum or the Belt and Road Forum. Though 
the Trump administration was perceived by many as unpredictable, many spotted a clear 
contrast between Xi’s keen leadership of capitalist development and a United States perceived 
as pursuing a new inward-looking and protectionist direction, more keen to demand than to 
lead.62 This understanding was reinforced from within the Trump administration, where then 
senior political adviser Steve Bannon, a lead author of Trump’s inaugural speech, was among 
those who cited the contrast: ‘I think it’d be good if people compare Xi’s speech at Davos and 
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President Trump’s speech in his inaugural. You’ll see two different world views’.63 In the run-
up to this new development, both official documents and our interviewees towed the lines that 
the BRI will lead to ‘a new type of major power relations’ (xinxing daguo guanxi) and that it 
will contribute to rather than challenge the existing international order.64 This relatively new 
concept focuses on mutual respect and the management of differences to ensure mutually 
beneficial cooperation – what China calls ‘win-win cooperation’ – and an avoidance of 
conflicts and confrontation.65 The concept tends to focus on Sino-US relations, though as 
argued by Pang it is possible to include other ‘new types’ of great powers such as Russia, the 
EU, India and Brazil, and possibly all G20 countries.66 BRI is important here, as it is the 
clearest manifestation to date of China’s attempts to manifest itself as a major global actor. If 
the BRI is successful, new great power relations will be needed or emerge by default, and the 
initiative itself with the new leadership role it implies for China requires such facilitating 
relations to be developed. It is not farfetched for commentators to therefore understand Xi’s 
speech as a proposition to world leaders to insert China in the leadership vacuum left by 
Trump’s expected isolationism and Europe’s continuing internal problems, if they want to 
continue and improve the existing capitalist and free market order. Even if the Trump 
administration will be limited to 4-8 years, and Europe’s internal problems might be solved 
(though this seems unlikely at the moment), the current vacuum is nevertheless a window of 
opportunity that Xi Jinping and the Chinese government have ceased upon. Even if we see a 
new US foreign policy and a revival of Europe in the relatively near future, the Chinese power-
position will be stronger than before as a result of recent developments. 
This displacement of the United States is not only visible by its absence from official BRI 
documents and from the maps that illustrate it. It is also underlined when the vision document 
repeats the common line that ‘China is committed to shouldering more responsibilities and 
obligations within its capabilities’, by embracing an alleged ‘trend towards a multipolar 
world’.67 Chinese officials and academics are typically careful to note that China opposes 
hegemonism (on the sometimes unspoken understanding that the United States promotes it), 
but scholars have noted that the alternatives offered often look surprisingly much like the 
hegemonism they claim to oppose.68 Most notably, the Sinocentric worldview espoused in 
both official and academic rhetoric in China operates through a dichotomisation of China and 
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the United States, where China’s goodness is contrasted to American badness.69 Another 
prime example of this rhetorical strategy in BRI narratives is the tendency for English 
language commentary on the BRI coming from China to emphasise that it is different from 
the Marshall plan because, as Wenhua Shan, Editor-in-Chief of The Chinese Journal of 
Comparative Law, puts it: 
 
Unlike the Marshall Plan, it does not exclude any countries, nor is it intended to serve 
any purposes of international power struggle. Rather it intends to explore a new 
model of international cooperation and global governance on the basis of the ‘Silk 
Road Spirit’, i.e., the spirit of peace and cooperation, openness and inclusiveness, 
mutual learning and mutual benefits.70  
 
It is interesting that such comments are now so commonplace,71 when the Marshall plan was 
also formally open, but Soviet States chose not to join, but form Comecon instead. Most 
significantly, it contributes to a rhetoric where China provides the open, equal and mutually 
beneficial alternative to an American-led world order that is by contrast portrayed as 
exclusionary, unequal and power grabbing. 
 
The attempted replacement or displacement of the United States in BRI rhetoric bears out in 
particularly significant ways in relation to the Asian region, over which the narration and 
implementation of Chinese leadership becomes particularly notable and controversial. The idea 
for BRI was originally put forward by prominent academic Wang Jisi, in a 2012 article for the 
Global Times, at the same time that Xi was transitioning into leadership of the party-state.72 
He argued that China should react to America’s ‘pivot to Asia’ under president Obama by 
‘marching west’ to expand economic and security ties with its western neighbours. The idea 
was that this would keep China and the US out of direct competition, and able to cooperate 
around shared interests in continental Eurasia. Xi took up the suggestion to expand westwards, 
but chose at the same time to focus on East Asia too. 
As Callahan points out in his article on the BRI and the new regional order, the BRI is part of 
a new Chinese ‘peripheral diplomacy’ (zhoubian waijiao) since 2013, which others argue 
signifies either a shift to Asia that displaces a previous focus on Europe and the United States, 
or a new direction that (re)balances China’s relations with Asia, Africa, Europe and China more 
appropriately.73 The vision document and surrounding rhetoric go to significant lengths to 
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emphasise that although this is a Chinese initiative, it represents ‘a common aspiration of all 
countries along their routes’.74 In the same period that Xi has developed the BRI, he has 
criticized the existing security architecture in Asia, which is built around bilateral security 
treaties between the United States and its allies. In what Callahan terms an ‘Asia-for-Asians’ 
argument, Xi has argued that ‘[i]n the final analysis, it is for the people of Asia to run the affairs 
of Asia, solve the problems of Asia and uphold the security of Asia. The people of Asia have 
the capacity and wisdom to achieve peace and stability in the region through enhanced 
cooperation’.75 
Who are the likely winners and losers from the BRI? 
In this article, we have suggested that the BRI is important both as a driver of networked 
capitalism and as an expression of a grand narrative of China as a unified state. We have argued 
that these two forms of spatialisation are not mutually exclusive, but rather come together in 
BRI narratives. The effect is a joint narrative that portrays China as the leader and protector of 
capitalism, and a better alternative to American leadership. Who, then, is most likely to gain 
from such an arrangement, and who is more likely to lose out? 
The winners and losers of the BRI will of course depend on the continued development of the 
initiative, on the state of the global economy as a whole, and on the success or otherwise of its 
various components. It is by no means a foregone conclusion that the BRI will be a success. If 
the BRI does succeed in developing in the way envisaged by the Chinese government, however, 
the clear capitalist drive identified by Summers means that we can expect megalopolises across 
Eurasia in particular – the key nodes of the network – to experience an economic upturn. Other 
places connected to the key network, including in East Africa and the South Pacific, may also 
stand to benefit economically by access to the envisaged lines of connectivity. Such economic 
strength may of course benefit some and not others, depending on how the resulting wealth is 
distributed and on how other things of value, such as local cultures or the environment, are 
negotiated in relation to this capitalist drive. As Summer also notes, where money, goods, and 
certain communications may flow relatively freely in network capitalism, labour does not. This 
will no doubt cause tensions along the belt and road, as growth is unevenly spread and capital 
migrates away from locales where it has been focused to date. 
One major issue with networked capitalism in the context of BRI is the possible impact of large 
scale movements of populations. There are legitimate worries that BRI projects will result in a 
migration flow of Chinese migrants that will not return to China. Based on extant data and 
literature on Chinese migration flows, it is to be expected that the BRI will bring with it a 
movement of Chinese people, including workers, state employees, entrepreneurs and 
accompanying families to countries along the Belt and the Road alike, though it is still too early 
to assess the extent.76 It is also difficult to assess how they are likely to impact on and be 
received in host countries. On the one hand, skilled migration may contribute to employment, 
capital accumulation and income in their destination countries, but on the other hand there is a 
risk that Chinese labourers may cause tensions and negative feelings as they risk being seen to 
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compete for low-wage jobs.77 In addition, a certain suspicion towards the intentions of China 
and Chinese populations in for example Russia, Central Asia and India also risk creating 
conflict. There have already been sporadic clashes along the path of the BRI, for example in 
Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan. Even if long term settlement is not the purpose of migration, it is 
likely to happen. While migration can come with human resource elements, as can be seen in 
parts of Africa where Chinese investment helps build the capacity of local works, ‘whole 
industry chain export’ is a common form of Chinese export in Africa and elsewhere.78 It is 
clear that migration that will by default follow the BRI needs to be addressed, and so far there 
seems to be little preparedness for handling such issues in China. Whether by design or not, 
migration and related risks are real and difficult to avoid. 
Having said this, the biggest winner from BRI success would no doubt be the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP). It is commonly understood that the legitimacy of party-state rule, or 
at least consent to it, relies on the combination of economic growth and nationalism.79 The 
party-state has been relatively successful at convincing Chinese citizens that only the CCP has 
the will, strength and ability that are necessary for delivering a better living standard for the 
Chinese people and a territorially unified and culturally great Chinese nation. The election of 
Donald Trump as United States president and the British decision to leave the European Union 
based on a popular referendum have both boosted the Chinese government’s claim that liberal 
democracy leads to self-harm and bad outcomes. If the BRI enables the Chinese party-state to 
position itself as the leader of a more stable, open and mutually beneficial international 
development than these Western systems are perceived to offer, it will further secure its rule 
through increased legitimacy or consent in the eyes of the domestic Chinese audience. 
Vis-à-vis other countries and peoples, the vision document follows on the elsewhere common 
trope of ‘win-win’ cooperation, which declares its values and desires to be everybody’s 
values and desires.80 For example, the vision document begins its conclusion by proclaiming: 
‘Though proposed by China, the Belt and Road Initiative is a common aspiration of all 
countries along their routes’.81 As we have seen, the ‘Silk Road spirit’ is said to be shared by 
‘all countries in the world.’ However, even if this claim is true, the BRI focuses on benefiting 
Asia and to some extent Europe and Africa with an emphasis in the belt and road on 
‘countries along their routes’.82 This indicates that even if everybody wins, some will likely 
win more than others. Neither the US nor the rest of North and South America are included 
along the route, though they may be able to cooperate with the initiative, for example as 
investors. As the lofty initiative materialises into more concrete plans and actions, it will 
likely become clear who will gain less – or lose more – from this new amalgam of Chinese 
nationalism and capitalist expansion. 
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Xi’s high profile organisation of the Belt and Road Forum in May 2017 already began to 
show signs of such division between those countries that see themselves as benefiting from 
the BRI in both economic and geostrategic terms, and those that do not. The event was 
attended by representatives from 66 countries and organisations, participants included state 
leaders such as Russia’s Vladimir Putin and Turkey’s Recep Tayyip Erdogan, and many 
delegations made great pains to publicly praise the initiative. However, state leaders from the 
United States and its G7 allies were notably absent, though an American delegation ended up 
participating (reportedly as a last-minute decision). The difficulties of maintaining China’s 
all-inclusive approach also became visible, for example, when it welcomed a North Korean 
delegation at the same time as Pyongyang launched its latest missile test, to international 
criticism. In a different setback, several EU countries stated their general support for the 
initiative, but declined to sign a key trade statement that the Chinese leadership had hoped to 
produce from the forum. Concerns over transparency of public procurement and social and 
environmental standards were said to cause their reluctance.83 India decided to completely 
boycott the event, citing similar concerns, but more importantly displeasure at the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor. The corridor is a BRI-labelled infrastructure project that will 
run through Kashmiri areas that India considers to be occupied by Pakistan. In an ironic twist, 
India came out in open criticism of the BRI stating that no country could join a project that 
disregards its core concerns of sovereignty and territorial integrity.84 These are principles that 
Chinese government actors regularly claim to defend, and much of the Chinese claim to 
better global leadership relies on the portrayal of China respecting other countries 
sovereignty where the US or a more general ‘West’ is said not to. Despite these difficulties, 
Xi and his party-state have now put so much money and prestige into the BRI that backing 
out or scaling back seems unlikely – and unexpectedly, Chinese media hailed the event as a 
great success. Xi announced that a second forum will be held in 2019. 
 
Despite the fact that support for the BRI is likely to be tempered as the initiative becomes more 
concrete, its ability to rally support to date stands in stark contrast to the United State’s 
‘America first’ policy stance under President Donald Trump. In line with this wider rhetoric, 
President Trump has denounced several free trade agreements as unfair to American workers, 
and pledged to withdraw the US from the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) agreement. The most 
likely replacement for TPP as the Asia-Pacific trade agreement is the Beijing-backed Regional 
Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP) agreement. 85  This agreement would allow 
China to ‘claim to be setting the rules of trade for Asia’ while American firms would be locked 
out of preferential benefits and access to Asian markets that their regional rival received as a 
result.86 President Xi has also suggested that it would be a possibility for TPP’s expected 
members to join RCEP. Ironically, Trump might ultimately enable Xi’s dream of making China 
great again. 
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Of course, Xi’s success does not depend on Trump alone, in particular not as his time in 
power will be 8 years at most, whilst the BRI vision is set up for the long term. However, it 
is clear that Trump’s approach to foreign policy has been a window of opportunity for China, 
which China has used skilfully to promote and put forwards its international leadership. There 
are also other possible obstacles for the BRI, including delicate relationships with other major 
powers in the region. With its focus on connectedness, it is not good for the project if some 
countries do not want to be part of the project. However, as a vision rather than a clear plan, 
the BRI has a good deal of flexibility when it comes to possible implementation creating 
space to by-pass non-partners. In that sense, countries defaulting or misappropriating Chinese 
loans might in fact be an even bigger problem, as that is a problem which is more difficult to 
get around. One final problem would be how to go about inducing cooperation from both 
governments and dissident minorities that may disrupt transport flows or the success of 
investments, not least as China traditionally takes a strong position against dissident 
minorities. These challenges all mark areas in need of more research, as solid data is essential 
if policy makers inside and outside China are to be able to predict and handle these problems.  
